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DESIGN AND EVALUATION OF A NEW AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM 
FOR VALIDATING THE SENDER OF AN EMAIL 
Sai B Sakamuri 
ABSTRACT 
 A new authentication mechanism for validating the source of messages over the 
Internet is designed and evaluated.  This mechanism is applied to email and is called 
Email++.  Email++ prevents identity forging (spoofing) and tampering of email contents.  
By preventing identity forging, Email++ can reduce the amount of spam received and 
limit the spread of viruses like Melissa, Love Bug, Bagle Worm, and Killer Resume.  
Email++ validates both the sender and the receiver of an email by confirming the 
sender’s identity with the domain mail server that delivered the email for the sender, and 
authenticates the receiver with hash value comparisons.  Email++ enables payment 
mechanisms, including micro-cash, and challenge response schemes that use puzzle 
solving.   
MD5 hash signatures generated both at the sender and the receiver locations are 
used for validating the sender’s identity and for making email tamper resistant in the 
network.  An out-of-band TCP connection established between the sender and the 
receiver is used as a communication channel for validating the sender as well as the 
sender’s email server. The information needed for establishing an out-of-band TCP 
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connection is obtained by querying the DNS (Domain Naming System), instead of using 
email headers from the received mail, which are susceptible to spoofing.       
     The Email++ technique is compared with existing anti spam and anti-spoof 
techniques like SPF, Yahoo Domain Keys, Microsoft Sender ID, TEOS and PGP. The 
Email++ specification is evaluated by developing both Email++ client and Email++ 
server programs in C language and using Sendmail 8.12 as the mail server. The 
performance of Email++ is compared with standard SMTP protocol implementation of 
Sendmail 8.12.  Several factors are considered in evaluating the performance. CPU 
demand, memory demand, bandwidth demand, email latency, and extra DNS load are 
measured for both email sender and the receiver. The performance evaluation results 
show that Email++ adds an extra CPU demand of about 11%. The extra memory required 
by Email++ is nearly 3%. The bandwidth demand of Email++ is around 15% greater than 
the standard SMTP for sending 500 emails of 3.5KB each. Extra load on DNS increases  
by one connection for every incoming mail at the receiver.
 1 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background 
Spam is becoming a major security threat to email systems. According to Verisign 
Inc. 80% of messages handled by its clients are classified as spam [34]. To date there is 
no perfect solution to stop spam completely, but groups of techniques can reduce the 
amount of spam. This thesis investigates a new method to reduce spam by preventing 
spoofing of email addresses. 
1.2 Motivation 
Network protocols and applications are designed based on the concept of trusting 
the network and its users. Security was not a vital concern when the original Internet 
protocols were being designed. Hence, protocols such as Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
(SMTP), Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and 
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) are all susceptible to spoofing.  
Vulnerabilities present in SMTP have made possible problems like spamming, phishing, 
email generated viruses and zombie SMTP servers. All the above techniques use email 
address spoofing; According to Federal Trade Commission’s report [15] 33% of the 
spammed emails are spoofed; Reference [23] shows 50% of email is spoofed. A study by 
Verisign Inc. shows that 93% of the phished emails are spoofed [36]; 100% of email 
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generated viruses are spoofed. The underlying security hazard of these security threats is 
spoofing. Consequently, there is a need to incorporate sender authentication in SMTP, 
which is the main contribution of this thesis. 
1.3 Contribution of this Thesis 
This thesis investigates the problem of spoofing, in particular in email systems, and 
proposes a new authentication mechanism for avoiding email forgery. Contributions 
include:  
• Review of existing proposals to control spam and email spoofing 
• Design and implementation of Email++, a new sender authentication mechanism 
that will prevent spoofing and in turn help reduce spam. 
• Comparison of Email++ to existing anti-spoof and anti spam techniques. 
• Performance evaluation of Email++ and description of the adaptation of this 
authentication mechanism to other systems. 
 1.4  Organization of this Thesis 
This section describes the organization of the remainder of this thesis 
• Chapter 2 describes the background of SMTP and spam, and reviews existing 
methods used to control spam 
• Chapter 3 describes the new email sender authentication mechanism called 
Email++, and describes the design, implementation, operation and validation of 
Email++ 
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• Chapter 4 compares Email++ with other popular existing sender authentication 
mechanisms like SPF, Yahoo Domain Keys, sender ID, Microsoft ticket server, 
PGP, and TEOS 
• Chapter 5 evaluates the performance of Email++ with respect to CPU utilization, 
memory demand, bandwidth demand, email latency, and DNS load 
• Chapter 6 presents conclusions and discusses future research directions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 BACKGROUND ON EMAIL AND SPAM 
2.1 Overview of the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) 
 
 This chapter describes SMTP, SMTP forging, the problem of spam and the 
existing techniques used to control spam. 
2.1.1 History of Email and Origin of SMTP 
 Originally, email was designed for the communication of information between 
groups of researches in the ARPANET network [4]. Even though the operation of email 
may appear simple, there are many conventions, standards and protocols behind its 
operation.  
ARPANET, the research project of DARPA (Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency) was the predecessor of the Internet. In order for the small circle of 
ARPANET users to be able to communicate, SNDMSG [19], the first email program, 
was developed and deployed. The earliest protocol used for delivering the mail was FTP. 
Some additional functionality was added to FTP to make it efficient for delivering mail. 
A separate protocol for email delivery was proposed and submitted to the IETF as RFC 
821 [27] in 1982. This RFC described Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) for 
handling mail. Later in 1989, RFC1123 [8] was developed to clarify and improve some of 
the specifications of RFC821. RFC 1425 [20] describes a framework over which all the 
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future extensions of SMTP can be built in a consistent way. RFC821, RFC1123 and 
RFC1425, collectively have been the core specification of SMTP for years. 
 
2.1.2 Overview of SMTP  
 
 Internet email systems are client/server, store-and-forward systems that primarily 
uses SMTP and POP3 or IMAP for communication. The main components involved in 
the system are the sender User Agent (UA), sender Message Transfer Agent (MTA), 
receiver UA, receiver MTA and communication protocol. The UA provides the interface 
between the user and his/her email server. The UA can be described as a program the 
email user uses to compose or read messages. Sender UA interacts with the sender, 
accepts the message from the sender, and transfers the mail to the sender’s mail server by 
establishing a network connection to the sender’s mail server. Receiver UA helps the 
receiver in retrieving the messages from his/her mail server by establishing a network 
connection to their mail server. The MTAs also referred to as email servers are 
responsible for collecting emails from the senders and delivering them to the receiver’s 
MTA. The message can be delivered directly to the receiver MTA, or may pass through 
several intermediate MTAs before reaching the destination. To ensure reliability and 
assure delivery of emails TCP/IP is used as the transport protocol. The communication 
protocols used are SMTP and IMAP or POP3. SMTP is the protocol used to exchange 
messages between MTAs, and also by a UA to send messages to its MTA. POP3 or 
IMAP are used by receivers to retrieve messages from their MTA.   
 The sender UA initiates the communication with the sender’s mail server when a 
request to send mail is received from the sender. It establishes a two-way TCP 
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communication channel to the sender’s MTA on port 25, and the mail is delivered to the 
sender MTA through the established channel. The SMTP protocol is used for the 
communication between UA and the MTA.  
The SMTP protocol defines a set of commands, which include information about 
the sender, receiver, and contents of the mail. The sender MTA accordingly receives the 
commands, processes them and replies with success or failure status codes. Figure 2.1 
shows the flow of email using SMTP. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1:  Flow of Email Using SMTP 
 
  The MTA processes the mail and places it in an outbound queue for delivery. 
The queue in the MTA is processed based on First Come First Serve (FCFS) or some 
other priority basis depending on the MTA configuration. Once the message is ready to 
be delivered, there are several things a sender MTA should do to transfer the mail: 
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• Determine the destination of the mail  
• Establish a TCP connection with the next MTA  
• Transfer the contents of the mail using SMTP as communication protocol  
• Shut down the connection. 
 To determine the destination of the mail, MTA uses the receiver’s email address, 
which contains the FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name). MTA uses the Domain Name 
System (DNS) to obtain the IP address of the receiver’s MTA. To do this the MTA 
performs a DNS query requesting the receiver’s MTA IP address. The MTA information 
is stored in mail exchange record (MX record) of the DNS entry for the domain. The MX 
record of the domain contains the host name of the mail exchanger of the receiver domain 
and the preference number of that exchanger. The MTA picks one of the hosts and 
delivers the mail using SMTP. 
 The next step involved in sending a mail is establishing an SMTP connection. 
This involves making a TCP connection to port 25 of the MTA or mail server. Sending 
the contents of the mail includes SMTP commands/replies between a client and server. 
There are several standard SMTP commands. Most prominent among them are HELO, 
MAIL FROM, RCPT TO, DATA and QUIT. Section 2.1.3 describes these commands in 
detail. Once the mail is delivered, the session is disconnected via the QUIT command. 
2.1.3 Steps Involved in Sending and Receiving an Email 
 
 The Figure 2.2 shows the simple commands and replies involved in sending a 
mail. The numbers in front of the replies sent from SMTP server to SMTP client 
represent the reply codes. The client uses HELO command to introduce itself to the 
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SMTP server.  The domain argument that is provided with HELO is used to populate the 
“received:“ header and “from:” header in the email headers. Once the HELO 
command is received the server responds with a 250 reply code containing its domain 
name. After this command is successful, both client and server are ready for further 
SMTP commands. The MAIL FROM command is the first command in the mail 
transaction. The address that is provided with this command is used to populate the 
“reverse-path:” header in the email headers. The server validates the domain name 
of the sender by checking whether the domain exists. To issue a RCPT TO command, the 
MAIL FROM command must be successful. The argument with this command provides 
the recipient’s email address. The address that is provided with this command is used to 
populate the “forward-path:” header. There can be several RCPT TO commands 
for one mail transaction.  
The client uses a DATA command to send the actual mail content. The message 
provided with this data is used by the MTA to populate the mail-data buffer. Before using 
the DATA command, the MAIL FROM and RCPT TO commands should be issued. The 
end of the message is indicated via a single dot on a line by itself. Thus care should be 
taken to avoid a single dot on a line by itself in the actual content. If a single dot on a line 
is required in the data, dot stuffing is done by the server, which adds an extra dot beside 
the single dot. The QUIT command is issued by the sender after delivering the data. This 
command terminates the established connection. 
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Figure 2.2:  Steps Involved in SMTP Handshake 
 
2.2 Spoofing of SMTP Headers 
Email spoofing means forging of SMTP header information in order to hide the 
actual origin of email. The spoofed email looks like it originated from somewhere else 
other than the actual source. To send spoofed email, a sender typically forges someone’s 
email address to send the email.   
Spoofing is possible because of vulnerability in SMTP protocol, which doesn’t 
validate the sender of the email. This section describes the SMTP headers that are 
susceptible to spoofing. The “from” or “Reply-to” header is easily susceptible to 
spoofing. While doing an SMTP handshake, the MAIL FROM command can take any 
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mail address; nowhere in the complete transaction is this address checked. The sender 
may provide any existing domain name and an existent or non-existent user in the 
domain. The mail is accepted and delivered to the destination. Another header that 
reveals the information is the “Received:” header. This header consists of the path the 
mail traveled before reaching the destination. The source domain and all the intermediate 
domains add a new “Received:” header to the email. Even this header is spoofable, 
however, through the introduction of dummy mail servers prior to the actual relaying of 
the mail through the network.  
Spoofing is possible at two levels, the domain and the user levels. Domain level 
spoofing means forging a valid domain name in the SMTP header while sending the mail. 
This technique is used by the spammers to hide their original domain name and prevent 
their domain from being black listed. Black listing is a technique in which a domain that 
sends spam is added to the list of blocked domain databases. In domain level spoofing a 
valid domain name and non-existent user name is provided in the forged address. In user 
level spoofing a valid domain name and user of that domain is forged. User-level 
authentication helps in preventing users from spoofing other users within the domain. 
This SMTP vulnerability has resulted in other problems like spamming, phishing 
and email-generated viruses. Spammers and virus generators can send email to anyone 
easily by spoofing email headers to hide their identity. Recent statistics on spam by 
Verisign Inc. show that over 80% of the email traffic was recognized as illegitimate 
spam. The same statistics also show an increase in email generated viruses and worms 
such as Melissa, Love Bug, Bagle Worm, and Killer Resume. 
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2.3 The Problem of Spam 
 Spam has become a major security issue in the email infrastructure. Its several 
disadvantages include the waste of resources like network bandwidth and it adds extra 
traffic in the network, which results in additional delay in the network. This affects other 
application in the network. Spam wastes time for workers in the organization in the form 
of categorizing and removing emails. It adds extra load on system administrators and 
mail servers who have to handle more traffic. Also, children receiving spam are exposed 
to adult content received through emails. 
2.3.1 Techniques Used for Spamming Emails 
 
 This section discusses the techniques spammers use. These techniques include 
email harvesting, blasting through open relays, and using zombie servers and temporary 
servers.  
 Email harvesting is a technique spammers use to acquire email addresses. 
Harvesting is done by programs that look for email addresses from websites, chat rooms, 
newsgroups, and online directories for web pages and domains. Reference [14] describes 
the techniques spam receivers can follow to circumvent the harvesting software. Email 
masking is used to alter published email addresses so that harvesters do not recognize 
them as valid email addresses. In email masking the address is masked by adding some 
logical text that human beings can interpret to extract the proper email address and trick 
the harvesting programs. 
 Open relays are used by spammers for sending millions of emails. Open relays 
refer to a mail server that allows anyone to connect to it and thus send email anywhere. 
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This relaying has its own advantages, like support for mail forwarding, and the fact that 
users of that domain can send from anywhere on the Internet [18]. But this feature is 
abused by the spammers to send illegitimate emails. RFC 2505 [22] provides several 
recommendations for SMTP MTAs to reduce spam. It describes that closing of open 
relay is one of the practices that helps in reducing spam. Nowadays an open relay is 
blacklisted. Reference [26] shows a sample black listed database.   
 A zombie server refers to a computer that is infected by a Trojan horse virus that 
changes the settings of the infected computers and makes them work like an open relay 
for sending emails. According to Sandvine [32], a network management firm, 80% of 
spam was generated by zombie servers. Spammers host temporary mail servers to blast 
out mail, and shut down a server to divert the in-bound SMTP traffic coming from 
undelivered mail. 
2.4 Existing Methods to Control Spam 
 
 Several methods have been proposed and implemented to reduce the amount of 
spam. The proposed techniques vary widely depending on the vulnerability they address, 
the technique they use, and the location where they are implemented. The existing 
methods can be broadly classified as filtering, sender authentication mechanisms, and 
payment-based methods. 
2.4.1 Filtering  
 
 Filtering is a technique through which incoming mail is verified, suspicious mail 
is classified as spam, and only mail that passes verification is delivered to the receiver. 
This filtering is usually done by the filter software that executes either at the receiver 
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before delivering the mail, or in the mail server that receives mail for that domain.  
Filtering is easy to implement over existing email systems. 
2.4.1.1 Filtering at the Receiver 
 
 Filtering of email at the receiver or at the receiver’s SMTP server has become 
commonplace.   Prominent filtering methods include keyword filters, scoring filters, and 
Bayesian filters. In keyword filtering, the contents of the email are searched for keywords 
that are most likely to appear in spam. A database for these keywords is maintained and 
constantly updated. Bypassing these filters is a very trivial task for spammers. Scoring 
filters are more efficient than keyword filters; these filters establish some rules and, based 
on them, assign a score to the keywords. The higher the score, the greater possibility of 
spam being present. The rules need to be constantly updated to maintain the efficiency of 
the filter. Bayesian filtering is the most accurate way to control spam [17]. This method 
uses the mail previously received by the user to form rules and a keyword database that 
dynamically adapts itself. 
The solution offered by the filtering techniques is temporary, however. They need 
constant updating and sometimes are error prone due to false positives. (Some legitimate 
mails are classified as spam.) False positives resulting from filtering may be a more 
serious threat to users than spam [35].  
 
2.4.1.2 Filtering in the Internet 
 The mail server that receives mail for the domain can also employ filtering 
techniques such as black listing and white listing. Black listing is a technique by which 
the known domains that relay spam are listed in the database. The receiver’s mail server 
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checks the source of the mail it receives. If the domain is listed in the black list database 
the mail is classified as spam. White listing is a technique by which the mail received 
from addresses that are present in the address book of the receiver is assumed to be 
legitimate and is delivered to the receiver without any further filtering. 
 Distributed Checksum Clearinghouse (DCC) [12] and Vipul’s Razor [37] are the 
two filtering techniques that rely on the fact that exactly the same spam mail is sent to 
several recipients within the domain. In this technique, when a user receives spam, the 
message is hashed and the checksum value is placed in the Vipul’s server or DCC server. 
The recipient, after receiving an email, can hash and check if the hash is listed in the 
Vipul’s or DCC server. If it is listed, the email is assumed to be spam and can be 
discarded. 
 
2.4.2 Sender Authentication Techniques 
 The sender authentication techniques do not rely on the contents of email to 
decide whether the mail is genuine; instead they try to check the source of the mail, 
authenticating the sender of the mail and accepting any mail from a valid sender. The 
motivation behind such techniques is the fact that most spammers forge their identity and 
use unreliable sources for spamming. These techniques can be classified as anti-spoof 
techniques and central certifying authority techniques.  
 
2.4.2.1 Anti-spoof  Techniques 
 
 These techniques avoid spoofing of email addresses and force spammers to send 
mail from their own domain. In these techniques the validation of the source of the mail 
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is done at the receiver side. The techniques discussed here are SPF [21], Yahoo domain 
keys [10], sender ID [24], and TEOS [33]. 
 SPF stands for Sender Policy Framework. Figure 2.3 shows the operation of SPF. 
In general, every domain has its own designated mail servers that send the SMTP traffic 
from that domain and act as mail exchangers. In SPF, every domain should publish the 
SPF records for each mail server of the domain. The format of SPF records is described 
in the Internet draft: each record should consist of the IP address of the mail server that 
delivers the mail. The SPF records are published in the DNS. The existing DNS records 
require modifications to include the SPF records. This makes the sending domain SPF 
compliant.  
 
Figure 2.3: Overview of SPF 
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 An SPF client should be installed on the receiver’s side either on the receiver’s 
user agent or mail server. An SPF client is capable of interpreting the SPF declarations 
for a domain. After receiving the mail, an SPF client extracts the sender’s IP address 
from the “Received:” header and the domain name from the “From:” header of the 
email and performs the DNS lookup for the SPF record for that domain. Depending on 
the response from the DNS, it validates the sender.  However SPF can detect only domain 
level spoofing. The user within the domain can forge other users in the same domain. 
 Sender ID [24] is a new proposal by Microsoft that relies on SPF. It addresses 
some of the issues that are not dealt with in SPF. Sender ID enhances SPF by allowing 
mail forwarding, enhancing the mechanism for mailing lists and mobile users. In Sender 
ID, the SPF records are published using XML format, unlike in SPF, where records are 
published in plain text. Sender ID doesn’t provide more protection than SPF. 
Yahoo, Inc. proposed another solution called Yahoo Domain Keys [10]. This 
technique uses PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) for sender authentication. In this 
technique, every domain should generate a public/private key. The public key should be 
published in the DNS.  The mail sent from the domain is digitally signed with the private 
key of the domain and the signature is sent along with the mail. Figure 2.4 shows the 
operation of Yahoo Domain Keys. On the receiver side, the receiver extracts the domain 
name from the mail, and obtains the public key corresponding to that domain. Using the 
obtained public key the receiver signs the received mail and compares the signature with 
the one obtained in the mail. If both signatures match the mail is not spoofed. Even 
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Yahoo domain keys like SPF and Sender ID detects only domain level spoofing. None of 
these techniques can detect spoofing within the domain 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Overview of Yahoo Domain Keys 
  
 TEOS [33] stands for Trusted Email Open Standard. This standard describes a 
new sender authentication policy and message assertion system for getting accurate 
information about the sender and the message. It describes three levels of security: for 
normal senders, bulk senders and commercial senders. In the first level of security, the 
sender SMTP server should run Trusted Email Send Engine (TESE) and the receiver 
should run Trusted Email Receive Engine (TERE). The TESE generates a securely 
verifiable statement of sender domain identity before sending the mail. The statement is 
verified by the TERE. If the identity fails the sender domain is revoked. The statement is 
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sent as an SMTP header. This process avoids domain level. In the second level security, 
along with first level, a Trusted Third Party (TTP) certificates are used to avoid both 
domain and user level spoofing. The third security level adds more accountability of the 
sender by using fully verified digital certificates for each email generated. The receiver 
should validate the certificate, and if the validation fails the mail is discarded. 
 
2.4.2.2 Trusted Third Party (TTP) - Certifying Authority  
  
 In trusted third party techniques, both the sender and receiver of the mail trust a 
central authority, which validates both the sender and the receiver. The central authority 
can pre-sign the mail or check the validity of the sender at the receiver’s request once the 
mail has been received. 
 Microsoft has proposed a technique called Ticket server [1], which acts as a 
central authority. In this technique, every sender must have a ticket in order to send mail. 
Later, the receiver cancels the ticket and refunds the sender if the mail is from a trusted 
source. This technique uses a PKC. The sender, receiver, ticket and ticket server have a 
unique key for identification. The ticket server issues a challenge to the sender. After 
getting the appropriate response, a ticket is issued to the receiver. The sender encrypts the 
message with the obtained ticket and transmits the encrypted mail. After receiving the 
mail, the receiver authenticates it with the ticket server using an identification key and 
obtains the key of the sender. Later, the receiver encrypts the message with the sender’s 
key to obtain the actual message. Optionally, the receiver can refund the key to the 
sender. 
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 Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [5] is another technique, which uses a PKC for 
authorizing the sender and the contents of the mail. In this technique, each sender should 
have a unique public-private key pair; before the mail is sent out, the message is signed 
with the sender’s private key. The public key is published in the PGP key server, or on 
the sender’s website. After receiving the mail, the receiver decrypts the mail with the 
public key. This technique avoids spoofing at the user level. 
 
2.4.3 Payment-based Methods 
   
 Payment-based methods make spam expensive to send. The motivation behind 
such methods is that spam is used as a source of advertising and marketing because it is 
the most economic way to reach people around the world. Payment based methods can be 
classified as monetary payment schemes, CPU cycle payment schemes, and memory 
payment schemes.  
2.4.3.1 Monetary Payment Schemes 
 
In monetary payment schemes, to make spam expensive to send, real currency 
mechanisms were proposed. Basically, the sender should spend money to send mail. 
Reference [29] describes Payword and Micromint, two micro-payment protocols. 
Reference [38] describes an enhanced micro-payment scheme. The practical 
implementation of such schemes for email systems did not seem feasible, since the mail 
had no currency and country limits. Cashramspam [9] was the first monetary payment 
scheme to be successfully implemented, and it was done so in Australia. In this system, 
users create accounts with Cashramspam and maintain a balance using credit cards. 
Though this may reduce spam, it is by nature susceptible to several forms of identity 
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theft, as the credit card and other personal information need to be provided for 
transactions with Cashramspam.  
2.4.3.2 CPU Cycle Payment Schemes 
 
 In CPU payment schemes, the sender of an email pays in terms of CPU cycles. In 
these techniques, a sender is issued puzzles that are CPU intensive. The result the sender 
sends to the receiver acts as a proof of work. If the result is acceptable, the mail is viewed 
by the receiver. With CPU payment schemes some of the resources on the sender side 
will be utilized for solving the puzzles, which may result in reducing the rate of 
spamming. The selection of the puzzles should be such that a normal user does not incur 
much load while sending mail, whereas for spammer, who is sending millions of emails 
per hour, the puzzles should cause an overload. In addition the puzzles should be easy to 
generate, easy to verify for the receiver, but time-consuming to solve for the sender. 
Reference [3] describes the hashcash scheme, which proposes the hashcash cost-function 
that can be used as a proof of work done by the sender of an email. Camram [8] is 
another payment scheme, which implements the concept of postage for electronic mail. 
One important feature the puzzle issued to the sender, should exhibit is a predictable 
solving time. Reference [30] proposes Time-Lock puzzles, whose solving time is 
predictable and are thus well suited for email systems. The amount of time required to 
solve the puzzles is deterministic. These puzzles are easy to create and verify and they 
cannot be parallelized. 
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2.4.3.3 Memory Payment Schemes 
 
  Memory payment schemes are similar to CPU cycle payment schemes but the 
puzzles that are issued to the sender are memory access intensive rather than CPU cycle 
intensive. The basic motivation for such schemes is that the time taken for solving the 
CPU intensive puzzles depends on the speed of the processor. For faster processors, time 
taken is less when compared to slower processors. Reference [2] proposes that the 
memory access speeds vary across machines much less than do CPU speeds; it also 
proposes that memory-bound functions may behave more similarly than CPU-bound 
functions. Reference [13] describes a few memory intensive puzzles, and proves by 
experimental results that memory-bound functions show more similarly than CPU- bound 
functions with slow and fast processors. 
 IM2000 [7] is a new protocol proposed by D. J. Bernstein. The gist of the protocol 
is that after the sender sends email it is not delivered to the receiver. Instead, it is stored 
under the sender’s disk quota in the sender’s mail server and a brief notification is sent to 
the receiver that an email is waiting from the sender. The receiver can download the mail 
directly from the sender’s mail server if he or she trusts the sender. This protocol forces 
the sender to store all his sent mail. This makes it impossible to send millions of emails 
due to physical space constraints in any realistic sender. The receiver downloads the mail 
from sender’s server directly. So all the spam mails would not be stored up by receivers. 
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2.5 Summary of Existing Methods of Controlling Spam 
 
 This chapter classified the existing solutions to three categories: filtering 
techniques, sender authentication techniques, and sender payment techniques. The figure 
2.5 below shows the detailed classification of existing solutions to control spam. 
 
Figure 2.5: Classification of Existing Techniques to Control Spam 
  The conclusion that can be made after analyzing all the techniques is that no 
single solution can completely prevent or block spam. The filtering techniques either at 
the receiver or in the Internet needs constant maintenance with updating of filtering rules; 
Sender authentication techniques can solve the problem of spoofing, which helps in 
mitigating the problem of spam but doesn’t solve the spam problem. The trusted third 
party sender authentication techniques are helpful, if deployed widely by all the existing 
servers.  The sender payment schemes make spam expensive to send, but are difficult to 
implement.
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CHAPTER 3 
 
EMAIL++: NEW METHOD TO AUTHENTICATE EMAIL SENDER 
 
This chapter describes the design, implementation, operation and validation of a 
new email sender authentication mechanism called Email++. 
3.1 Objective 
  The objective is to design a new mechanism for authenticating the sender of an 
email. This mechanism can detect spoofing of email addresses and thus prevent an email 
receiving user agent from actually receiving a spoofed email. This makes SMTP a more 
secure communication format for email. The mechanism should conform to the 
requirements specified below. 
3.2 Requirements of Sender Authentication System 
This section describes the requirements of the new authentication mechanism. 
• Compatible to the existing email system, with minimal changes to the existing 
SMTP. 
• Capable of detecting both domain level and user level spoofing. 
• Should not degrade the throughput or increase resource utilization and latency of 
the mail server or the mail client. 
• Should not introduce any extra security threats that are not there in the existing 
email system.
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• Should be easily implementable over the existing system without involving 
complex changes to the design of existing system. 
3.3 Overview of Email++  
This section presents an overview of Email++. For each email sent out from an 
authentic user of the domain, the sender's SMTP server calculates the MD5 hash [28] of 
the email and stores it in the user’s account. The receiver, after receiving the email, 
calculates the MD5 value and sends it back to the sender's SMTP server. This 
communication is achieved via an out-of-band TCP connection made on some pre-
determined port number. The receiver stores the mail in a temporary folder before 
delivering it to the inbox. If the mail is legitimate, then the MD5 value of the sender and 
the receiver should match. If this is the case, the sender's SMTP server sends 
"EMAIL_OK" to the receiver, and the mail is moved from the temporary folder to the 
receiver's inbox. In the case of spoofed email, the MD5 hash value of the receiver cannot 
be found at the sender and the mail is deleted from the temporary folder without being 
sent to the receiver's inbox.  
        Using an out-of-band TCP connection for sender validation is the key concept 
in Email++. To accomplish this, the sender's SMTP server runs a service for validating 
users of its domain. The receiver takes the domain information of the sender from the 
SMTP headers of the received mail and uses this domain information to query the DNS 
servers for the valid IP address of the sender’s SMTP server. The receiver connects to the 
sender’s SMTP server on a predetermined port number. 
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       One more advantage to using this out-of-band connection is that the sender’s SMTP 
server will be overloaded with a huge amount of queries from all of the users who 
received the email. If a spammer bursts out millions of emails, then his or her SMTP 
servers will have to answer millions of queries, which may result in Denial of Service 
(DoS) [16]. This forces the SMTP servers to validate their users before accepting an 
email, or place a limit on the amount of mail that a user can send. 
3.4 Design of Email++ 
The existing SMTP protocol does not validate the sender’s identity before accepting 
email for forwarding. This makes it easy for the sender to forge any domain or user 
identity within the domain. This vulnerability made spoofing and in turn spamming easy. 
Email++ addresses this issue by adding sender authentication capabilities to SMTP, 
making it more secure. This authentication is incorporated by making the receiver query 
the sender SMTP server to make sure the mail was in fact sent from the valid user of the 
domain. The figure below shows the normal email flow shown in Chapter 2 along with 
the incorporated new Email++ authentication capability. 
From the Figure 3.1 we can see that the sender SMTP server and receiver host are 
involved in the authentication process. Both SMTP server and receiver host need 
modifications in order to incorporate the new authentication capability. This is achieved 
by adding the server modifications to the sender SMTP server, through an Email++ 
server, and the client modifications at the receiver through an Email++ client. The 
Email++ server is responsible for running the authentication service. The Email++ client 
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is responsible for authenticating the sender of an email. The Figure 3.2 shows the new 
added components. 
 
Figure 3.1: Email Flow Along with Email++ Authentication Capability 
The dotted lines in Figure 3.2 indicate the new components added in Email++ that 
does not exist in the normal SMTP. The design of a new authentication mechanism is 
discussed separately for Email++ client and Email++ server.  
 
Figure 3.2:  Top-level Design of Email++ 
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3.4.1 Design of Email++ Server  
 This section describes the design of Email++ server. The Email++ enabled 
SMTP server must authenticate the sender before accepting the mail. If the authentication 
is successful then the email information is stored in the user’s account. The Email++ 
enabled SMTP server should also host a validation service that accepts a request from the 
receiver and sends a response back. The response should indicate whether the mail was 
really sent from the valid user of that domain. Figure 3.3 shows the functionality of the 
Email++ server. 
 
Figure 3.3: The Functionality of Email++ Server 
 In order to identify the valid senders of the domain, the SMTP server issues 
some challenges. This challenge response can be a simple username and a password. All 
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users should be authenticated before they are allowed to use any services from the SMTP 
server.  
3.4.1.1 Generating MD5 Hashes for Authenticated Users 
 Once the user is authenticated successfully, the Email++ server module extracts 
the required data from the SMTP headers for generating the MD5 hashes and saves the 
hash information in the user accounts. This functionality is shown as 1 in Figure 3.3. 
Only the email message and the receiver’s email address are used in generating the 
hashes, because these contents are not modified in the email transit. One advantage of 
using the receiver’s email address for generating the MD5 hash is that a sender who is 
sending to multiple recipients needs to generate multiple hashes. If the sender is a 
spammer relaying millions of emails, MD5 hash generation may cause an extra overhead. 
Figure 3.4 below shows a sample SMTP session. The underlined contents are used for 
generating the MD5 hash value. 
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Figure 3.4:  Contents Used for Generating the MD5 Hash 
 
 The RCPT TO: value and the DATA value are sent as input to the MD5 hash 
generating algorithm, which generates the 128-bit hash value. Figure 3.5 shows the 
sample hash generation for the above mail.  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Hash Generation Process 
 
220 localhost.localdomain ESMTP Sendmail 8.12.5/8.12.5; 14:36:18 -0400 
 
HELO MICKEY 
 
250 localhost.localdomain Hello giga4.csee.usf.edu [131.247.2.17], pleased to meet  
 
MAIL FROM:sender@mydomain.com 
 
250 2.1.0 ssakamur@mickey.csee.usf.edu... Sender ok 
 
RCPT TO:receiver@somedomain.com 
 
250 2.1.5 ssakamur@mickey.csee.usf.edu... Recipient ok 
Figure 3.3 The functionality of Email++ server 
DATA 
354 Enter mail, end with "." on a line by itself 
 
This is the body of the message 
. 
250 2.0.0 i94IaIWI004759 Message accepted for delivery 
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 The hash value that is generated is a constant 128-bit value for any size of 
message. This hash value and the timestamp showing when the mail was accepted for 
delivery are stored in a separate log in each user account. The Email++ server accesses 
the account of the sender and saves the information for each email sent out by the sender. 
The stored information is of the format shown in Figure 3.6. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 : Stored MD5 Message Format 
 
The timestamp value is added to the contents of the mail and sent to the receiver. The 
overall functionality of hash generation and storing of information is shown in figure 3.7 
 
Figure 3.7:  MD5 Hashing and Storing Process 
 All mail that reaches the SMTP server is forwarded in the network. The mail 
received from authenticated users (i.e. those users who authenticated successfully with 
username and password) is hashed and the information is stored in the respective user 
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accounts and forwarded in the network. Even the mail received from users who did not 
authenticate successfully is forwarded in the network, assuming these users are using this 
domain mail server as an intermediate MTA. Thus Email++ allows open relaying and at 
the same time distinguishes the valid users of the domain. 
3.4.1.2 Running the Sender Validation Service 
 The sender SMTP server should host a validation service on some pre-
determined port number for validating its domain users. This service is shown as 2 in 
Figure 3.3. The service should accept the out-of-band TCP connections from the 
receivers and obtain the account information and MD5 hash of the received mail. This 
information is compared against the information in the corresponding user’s account. If a 
match is found an “EMAIL_OK” message is sent back to the receiver. If not, the message 
“EMAIL_FAIL” is returned to the receiver.  “EMAIL_OK” implies that the mail 
originated from that specific domain and that the user was authenticated with the mail 
server before sending the mail. “EMAIL_FAIL” implies that the mail apparently 
originated in that specific domain, but that the user was not authenticated with the mail 
server, which means that the mail may be spoofed. Figure 3.8 below shows the 
communication between the receiver and the sender SMTP server. 
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Figure 3.8:  Out of Band TCP Connection 
3.4.2 Design of Email++ Client 
 On the receiver side, the Email++ client receives the mail from the receiver’s 
mail server before it is delivered to the receiver’s inbox. The Email++ client implements 
a temporary mailbox, which stores all the new mail that is to be validated. Only the 
validated mail is placed in the receiver’s mailbox. The process of sender authentication 
involves (1) obtaining the sender SMTP server’s IP address to establish an out-of-band 
TCP connection; and (2) using the established out-of-band connection to inquire the 
sender’s mail server whether the sender is a valid user of the domain, and whether the 
received mail was delivered from that domain. Figure 3.9 shows the functionality of the 
Email++ client. 
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Figure 3.9:  Functionality of Email++ Client 
3.4.2.1 Obtaining the Sender Mail Server’s IP Address 
 The most important issue for the receiver is getting the IP address of the 
sender’s SMTP server. This function is labeled as 1 in Figure 3.9. The IP address can be 
obtained from the SMTP headers in the mail, but the headers are not reliable as they are 
susceptible to spoofing. In Email++, the receiver gets the IP address of the mail server by 
contacting the DNS [25]. The receiver extracts the domain name of the sender from the 
“Apparently-From” SMTP header and uses that domain name and queries the DNS 
server for the mail server’s IP address. In the DNS records, the MX record consists of the 
IP address of the mail server for a given domain.  
3.4.2.2  Authenticating the Sender 
 The receiver uses the IP address obtained by querying the DNS server to make 
an out-of-band TCP connection to the server on some predetermined port number. This 
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port number should be the same as the port number that the Email++ server runs the 
validation service. The receiver also extracts the mail contents and the time stamp from 
the email. It appends the recipient mail address to the mail contents and generates the 
MD5 hash value. The MD5 hash, the time stamp and the username of the sender are sent 
to the sender’s email server on the established TCP connection. This is done by the 
validation service in figure 3.9. The sender’s email server extracts the hash value and 
searches for the matching MD5 value in the user’s account. If a match is found, the 
sender is considered authenticated and the mail is not spoofed. If the mail is spoofed, the 
sender’s address will be contacted but no MD5 match will be found in the sender’s 
account as the sender did not send the mail, and an “EMAIL_FAIL“ will be sent back to 
the receiver. This mechanism effectively detects spoofing both at the domain and user 
level. The message formats used for the communication are shown below. The time 
stamp is extracted from the mail contents and the sender name is taken from the 
“Apparently-From:” header, which contains the sender’s email address.  
 If the response from the sender’s server to receiver is “EMAIL_OK”, the mail is 
removed from temporary mailbox and placed in the user’s mailbox. If the reply is 
EMAIL_FAIL, the Email++ client deletes the mail before it is sent to the receiver’s 
inbox. The message formats used for communication are shown in Figure 3.10. 
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Figure 3.10:  Message Formats for Out of Band Communications 
3.5 Implementation of Email++ 
 
 The Email++ mechanism can be incorporated into the existing SMTP 
framework by adding the sender authentication functionality and MD5 hash management 
functionality to the SMTP server. The validation service can be implemented as a 
separate server, but should be running in the same host as the SMTP server. The sender 
authentication is done using the Validate_Sender ( ) procedure. The procedure is shown 
in Figure 3.11 
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Figure 3.11:  The Validate_sender Procedure 
 The Record_Information() procedure takes the contents of the mail 
(MAIL_MESSAGE) and the recipient email address (RCPT_ADDRESS) extracted from 
DATA and RCPT TO:  SMTP commands. Figure 3.12 shows the flow chart for the 
Record_Information( ) procedure. 
 The Generate_MD5_Hash( ) shown in figure 3.12 can be any MD5 
implementation that is in conformance with the RFC 1321. 
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Figure 3.12:  Record_information Procedure 
   The Email++ client part can be added to the receiver’s UA. The client 
part should establish an out-of-band TCP connection to the sender’s SMTP server, and 
authenticate the sender. It should maintain a temporary mailbox for storing the mail 
initially. The receiver should query the DNS to get the IP address of the sender. The 
query/response can be a standard DNS query for MX record. Figure 3.13 shows the 
implementation of flow of communication between the sender’s SMTP server and the 
receiver. 
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Figure 3.13: Implementation of Communication Between 
      Sender’s SMTP Server and the Receiver 
 
 If a sender payment scheme is to be implemented over the Email++ 
architecture, CPU-intensive puzzles like TimeLock Puzzles could be used. Reference 
[13] describes the application of TimeLock puzzles. The established out-of-band 
connection can be used by the receiver to issue the puzzle. The sender can send back the 
result on the same TCP connection 
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3.6 Operation of Email++  
This section summarizes the operation of Email++ by showing the sequence of 
steps involved in sending an email. 
• The sender MTA validates the sender by username/password, and accepts the       
             mail for delivery. 
• The validated sender information is stored in the MD5 log for each user. The     
            MD5 hash of the message and the timestamp showing when the message was   
accepted for delivery are stored. 
• All the mail received at the SMTP server is relayed in the network. 
• Several intermediate MTA’s may be involved in routing the mail to its final   
            destination. 
• When the receiver checks the mail, all the new emails are initially directed to the 
Email++ client, which stays in-between the receiver’s SMTP server and the 
receiver. The Email++ client calculates the MD5 hash, and extracts the 
timestamp. 
• Email++ client extracts the domain name from the MAIL FROM: SMTP header 
and queries the DNS for the IP address. 
• The IP address obtained in Step 6 is used for establishing an out-of-band TCP  
            connection. The Email++ client sends the MD5 hash, timestamp and username to 
the sender SMTP server. The MVS system checks for the matching MD5 in the 
users account. If there is a match, it sends “EMAIL_OK”. If there is not a match, 
it sends “EMAIL_FAIL”. 
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• Depending on the response, the mail is delivered to the receiver’s inbox. In case 
of EMAIL_FAIL, the local policy (eg. To discard the email) will be applied to the 
mail. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.14: Steps Involved in Sending Email in Email++ 
 
3.7 Validation of Email++ 
 
 This section describes the validation of Email++. The Email++ design is validated 
by implementing both Email++ client and server programs in C language. The Email++ 
server is targeted to the Linux operating system. 
A separate mail server for the csee.usf.edu domain is hosted and runs Sendmail 
software. The client program is developed in C language and is targeted to Windows 
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operating systems. The figures 3.15, 3.16 and 3.17 shows the sequence of execution steps 
for non-forged email. The “root” is sending email to “user”.  
The username and password are “sai”. Figure 3.15 shows the client interface for 
sending the email. The client is invoked by “root” to send mail to the “user”. 
 
Figure 3.15: The Client Interface Used by “root” for Sending Email 
 The mail server validates the “root” and accepts the mail for delivery to the 
“user”. The receiver of the mail invokes the Email++ client for checking the email. The 
Email++ client gets the mail from the receiver’s mail server and performs the out-of-band 
validation before placing the mail in user’s inbox. Figure 3.16 shows the output from the 
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Email++ client. After receiving the EMAIL_OK command from the sender’s mail server, 
the mail is moved to the receiver’s inbox and is mail is visible to the receiver. 
 
Figure 3.16: The Client Interface Used By “user” for Checking Email 
 Figure 3.17 shows the sequence of events that occurs in Email++ server, which 
accepts the TCP connection and receives the MD5 hash, timestamp and username, and 
compares the hash value and the timestamp against the already stored values in the user’s 
account. In this case as the email is not spoofed, an exact match for timestamp and MD5 
hash were found in the root’s account. If the match is found “EMAIL_OK” command is 
sent to the reciver. 
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Figure 3.17: Output from Email++ Sender of Root’s Mailserver 
3.7.1 Prevention of Spoofing 
 
 Consider the scenario where “root” is the valid sender of the domain 
mickey.csee.usf.edu; “spoofer” from a different domain tries to spoof as “root”.   
 In the client program, which accepts the mail for delivery, the sender name is 
given as root@mickey.csee.usf.edu.  But in sender authentication, a valid username is 
given and an invalid password is given (as “spoofer” does not know the password of 
“root”). Figure 3.18 shows the client interface used by “spoofer” for sending email as 
“root”. 
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Figure 3.18: The Client Interface Used by “spoofer” for Sending Email as “root” 
Figure 3.19 shows the screen shot of the interface used by “user” for checking email. In 
this case the final status received is “EMAIL_FAIL”, which is the expected result for 
spoofed email. 
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Figure 3.19:  The Client Interface Used by “user” for Checking Email 
 Figure 3.20 shows output from the Email++ server. When the wrong password is 
entered, the sender’s information is not stored in the email server, since it is assumed that 
he or she is not the valid user of the domain. Hence, when the authentication is done, 
EMAIL_FAIL is received from the sender. Figure 3.20 shows the output from the mail 
server. 
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Figure 3.20: Output from the Email++ Server. 
 It is observed that the spoofer’s mail MD5 and timestamp are not stored in the 
root’s account. The Email++ server returns EMAIL_FAIL to the receiver.    
3.7.2  Prevention of Tampering 
 Consider the scenario where “root” is the valid sender of the domain 
mickey.csee.usf.edu. The contents of the mail sent by “root” are modified in transit and 
tested to see if the Email++ server identifies it. 
 After the mail is received, the contents of the mail are modified prior to the 
generation of the hash value in the Email++ client program; This emulates the contents 
being modified in transmission. The MD5 hash of the modified contents is sent in the 
query to the sender’s Email++ server. Figure 3.21 shows the client interface for sending 
mail. Figure 3.22 shows the output from Email++ client. 
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Figure 3.21: The Client Interface Used by “root” for Sending Email 
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Figure 3.22: The Client Interface Used by “user” for Checking Email 
 The MD5 value of the TamperedMessageuser@mickey.usf.edu should be 
generated, instead extra characters “ab” are appended at the end and the MD5 hash is 
generated. This emulates a message being tampered with in transit. Figure 3.23 shows the 
output from the sender’s mail server. 
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Figure 3.23: The Output from Email++ Server  
 It is observed that the hash value obtained doesn’t match with the hash value 
that is stored, even though the timestamp matches. The Email++ server returns 
EMAIL_FAIL to the receiver. Hence, the Email++ mechanism effectively identifies the 
tampered mail.
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CHAPTER 4 
COMPARISON OF EMAIL++ TO EXISTING METHODS 
     Chapter 3 described the new authentication mechanism for email, called Email++.  
It described the design, operation, implementation and validation of Email++. This 
chapter compares Email++ with existing sender authentication techniques. Email++ is 
compared with SPF (Sender Policy Framework) [21], Microsoft’s Sender ID [24], Yahoo 
Domain Keys [10], Microsoft’s ticket server [24], ePrivacy’s Trusted Email Open 
Standard (TEOS) [33], Cashramspam [9], and PGP (Pretty Good privacy)[25]. 
4.1 Classification of Sender Authentication Schemes 
 Sender authentication protocols considered in this chapter can be primarily 
categorized (1) based on whether they use DNS or central authority for authenticating the 
sender and (2) based on the level of the authentication such as domain level or user level. 
The detailed classification is shown below. 
• Authentication strategy  
 DNS-based authentication. 
 Central authority-based authentication 
• Granularity of authentication 
 
 Domain level authentication 
 User level authentication 
 Handling temporary SMTP servers
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• Security vulnerabilities 
 
 Susceptible to DNS attacks 
 
 Extra DNS load 
 
 Extra traffic load into network 
 
• Complexity of implementation 
 
 Needs a flag day 
 
 Needs modifications to SMTP protocol 
 
 Needs modifications to DNS 
 
• Miscellaneous features  
 
 Validates message content 
 
 Allows forwarding and relaying of mail 
 
 
4.1.1 Classification Based on Authentication Strategy   
 Authentication strategy refers to the strategy followed by the authentication 
scheme to check the validity of the sender information. The protocols discussed here 
depend widely on either DNS or a central authority system for checking the correctness 
of the sender’s information. 
4.1.1.1 DNS-based Authentication  
In DNS-based authentication schemes, the correctness of the information in the 
SMTP headers is crosschecked with the information in the DNS, which is more reliable 
than the SMTP headers. SPF, SenderID, Yahoo domain keys, Email++, and TEOS uses 
DNS-based authentication and need modifications to DNS, whereas Email++ uses the 
existing DNS system. 
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4.1.1.2 Central Authority-based Authentication  
 Some of the proposals for sender authentication such as Microsoft Ticket server, 
Cashramspam, and PGP use a central certifying authority for validating the sender. The 
central authority either pre-authorizes the mail by digitally signing the email, or 
authorizes the sender based on the receiver’s request. In Microsoft’s ticket server, the 
sender is authorized based on the user’s request. In Cashramspam, each email is 
authorized before it is actually delivered. In PGP, the centralized key server is used for 
publishing the public key of the sender. 
Both of the strategies described above have pros and cons. DNS-based systems 
are advantageous because they use the existing system, but they are vulnerable to DNS 
attacks. Centralized systems are advantageous because they are more secure, but they are 
harder to implement than the DNS-based systems.   
4.1.2 Classification Based on Granularity of Authentication  
 The sender authentication schemes can also be classified based on the granularity 
of authentication, that is, to what extent the authentication is done and the levels of forgery   
the scheme can detect. 
4.1.2.1 Domain Level Authentication  
Domain Level Authentication is the verification of the validity of the domain 
name of the sender. This helps to identify domain level spoofing, and this is a significant 
factor to consider, as it helps domains to safeguard their identity from spammers and 
hackers. This authentication also inhibits bounced SMTP traffic from congesting the 
domain. There are certain tradeoffs involved in achieving this authentication. The process 
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may add latency in email delivery; some existing proposals require modifications to DNS 
standards, and the process of authentication for each email consumes extra resources 
including CPU, memory, and network bandwidth. SPF, Yahoo Domain keys, and Sender 
ID use domain level authentication.  
4.1.2.2 User Level Authentication   
 In user level-authentication, along with the domain name the actual sender is also 
validated. In addition to avoiding domain-level forging, the user within the domain is also 
validated before accepting an email. In addition to the tradeoffs associated with domain 
level authentication, this mechanism can impose mandatory user validation features, like 
username and password authentication, before the mail is accepted for delivery. This is 
optional in current systems. Email++, Cashramspam, PGP, and Ticket server all use user 
level authentication. Yahoo domain keys can be made more granular, but the current 
proposal supports up to domain level only. 
4.1.2.3 Temporary SMTP Servers  
 Temporary SMTP servers are the mail servers that are not always available. One 
of the techniques used by spammers to avoid bounced SMTP traffic is to blast out 
millions of emails and clog SMTP servers.  If the sender’s server is temporary and not 
available, the probability of the sent mail being a spam is high. So, the proposed 
mechanism should ensure that the sender server is available before delivering the mail to 
the receiver’s mailbox. This authentication process may add latency to the delivery of 
mail. The process of authentication for each email adds some extra load to the receiver. 
Only Email++ handles temporary SMTP servers. 
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The schemes that are more granular are better. Email++ is better than the other 
proposed techniques, as its granularity is up to user level. In addition, it handles 
temporary SMTP servers. 
4.1.3 Classification Based on Security Vulnerability  
 Another way to classify the techniques is based on their security vulnerabilities.   
4.1.3.1 Susceptible to DNS Failures  
  Many anti-spoofing proposals like SPF, sender ID, Yahoo Domain Keys, and 
Email++ completely rely on DNS for sender authentication. DNS itself is susceptible to 
hacking, resulting in Man-In-The-Middle attacks, DNS spoofing, and DNS Hijacking [6].  
The effect of all these DNS vulnerabilities on the proposed system should be carefully 
explored.   
4.1.3.2 Adds Extra DNS Load  
 DNS load is an important constraint to be considered. The extra load that the 
sender authentication techniques add on the DNS server should be predictable. The new 
system should not add a lot of DNS load. If the load added is too heavy for the DNS 
server to handle, the system may crash and affect the other systems that use DNS for their 
proper functioning. SPF, Sender ID, Yahoo Domain Keys, Email++, and TEOS all add 
extra load on DNS. 
4.1.3.3 Adds Extra Network Traffic    
 Schemes like Ticket Server, PGP, Email++, and Yahoo Domain Keys adds 
extra traffic to the network. The extra traffic should be predictable, comparatively low, 
and it should not degrade the performance of the existing system by introducing delays in 
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transmission. Email++ adds more traffic into the network because of the out-of-band TCP 
connections from receivers to senders.  
4.1.4 Classification Based on Complexity of Implementation  
 One of the important requirements for the sender authentication scheme is its 
complexity of implementation 
 
4.1.4.1 Need a Flag Day  
 Flag Day can be described as a day on which there should be a complete 
adaptation of the new proposed mechanism for the existing system to work properly from 
the day after Flag Day. It can be described as a day on which all the existing email 
systems should change to the new proposed system. Furthermore the email system is 
down that day.  This is the most important parameter to consider, because such drastic 
adaptation may not be feasible in a real world implementation. A new system should co-
exist with the already prevalent email infrastructure. The mechanism should work even if 
the majority of the email systems are not prepared to adopt the new system. The new 
authentication mechanism should not be expected to bring about an abrupt change in the 
overall existing system, but should rather bring about gradual change. All of the schemes 
reviewed are designed to be gradually adoptable. 
4.1.4.2 Modifications to SMTP Protocol 
  The new proposed mechanism should not modify the standard SMTP protocol. 
As SMTP is widely deployed, a minor modification may result in an effect on the 
majority of existing systems. If the modification to SMTP is mandatory, in order to make 
it more secure, then the practical implementation of the scheme should be evaluated more 
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thoroughly and carefully. The tradeoffs in implementing this include changes in the 
current SMTP standards, which affect current systems. Email++, Yahoo Domain Keys, 
and Ticket Server need modifications to SMTP protocol. Sender ID needs modifications 
to the SMTP server in order to support forwarding. 
4.1.4.3 DNS Modifications 
  Some of the sender authentication mechanisms described in Chapter 2 use DNS 
records for the validation of the sender identity. Some mechanisms propose modifying 
the DNS protocol by adding extra records or data to achieve this.  This modification may 
also impact other systems that use DNS. The proposed mechanism should not modify the 
DNS or, if the modification is mandatory, the impact of the modification should be 
inspected carefully. Implementing such a mechanism may result in changes in current 
standards. SPF, Sender ID, Yahoo Domain Keys need modifications to DNS. Email++, 
even though it uses DNS-based authentication, needs no modification to DNS. 
 The authentication mechanism should be simple and easily implementable. It 
should not require a flag day, but should favor gradual adaptation. It should propose no or 
minimal changes to the SMTP and DNS protocols, and the modifications should be 
backward compatible. 
4.1.5 Miscellaneous Features  
4.1.5.1 Validates Message Content   
 Some of the mechanisms like SPF and Sender ID validate the sender, but not the 
contents sent. Content validation is important, as the data may be tampered with in the 
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transmission, either intentionally or accidentally [31]. Email++, PGP, Yahoo Domain 
Keys, and Ticket Server validate the message content. 
4.1.5.2 Allows Relaying 
 Stopping open relaying is one of the common security measures taken by 
domain administrators to protect their domain. But when SMTP was designed, relaying 
was included on purpose. There are several advantages of relaying as described in [42]. 
For this reason, a new mechanism that favors relaying is better than the one that hinders 
it. Another research study at Internet Mail Consortium shows that the amount of spam is 
not related to the number of open relays [12]. Sender ID and Email++ allow for the 
relaying of mail. 
4.2 Comparison to Existing Sender Authentication Techniques 
 This section tabulates the summary of the comparison of SPF, Sender ID, Yahoo 
Domain Keys, Microsoft Ticket Server, TEOS, Cashramspam, PGP, and Email++. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the comparison charts. 
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Table 4.1 Summary of Existing Anti-spoof Techniques 
Name 
 
SPF Sender ID TEOS Yahoo 
Domain keys 
Email++ 
Detect Domain 
Level spoofing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Detect user level 
spoofing No No Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Doesn’t Need a 
Flag Day 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Doesn’t need 
modification to 
SMTP Protocol 
 
Yes 
 
No No 
 
No 
 
No** 
Doesn’t need DNS 
modifications 
 
No 
 
No No No 
 
Yes 
 
Not susceptible to 
DNS failure 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
Validates message 
content No No Yes Yes Yes 
Doesn’t need 
central certifying 
authority 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Handles temporary 
SMTP servers No No No No Yes 
Allows open 
relaying 
 
No 
 
Yes No No Yes 
 
** In Email++ the SMTP protocol needs no modification as Email++ doesn’t add any 
extra headers to the existing protocol. The Email++ server module can run as a separate 
service, over an existing mail server. 
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Table 4.2 Summary of Existing Anti Spam Techniques 
 
Name 
 
Microsoft 
Ticket 
Server 
CashRamSpam 
PGP 
(Pretty Good 
Privacy) 
Does user level 
authentication Yes Yes Yes 
Doesn’t need Flag Day 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Doesn’t need modification 
to SMTP Protocol 
 
Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Doesn’t need DNS 
modifications Yes Yes Yes 
Not susceptible to DNS 
failure Yes Yes Yes 
Validates message content Yes No Yes 
Doesn’t need Central 
certifying authority No No Yes** 
Email sent in clear text Yes Yes Yes 
Public Key Cryptography 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
** PGP doesn’t require central certifying authority, if the public key is not published in 
the PGP key server. 
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4.3 Summary of Comparison 
• Email++ is the better than other DNS-based authentication schemes as it 
utilizes DNS, but requests no modification to the existing DNS. 
• Email++, PGP, Cashramspam, and Ticket Server that provide user-level 
authentication are more advantageous than SPF, Yahoo Domain Keys, and 
Sender ID. 
• SPF does not propose any modifications to SMTP; Email++ proposes no 
modifications to DNS. Sender ID and Yahoo domain keys, proposes changes 
to both SMTP and DNS. 
• All the DNS-based schemes are vulnerable to DNS attacks and introduce DNS 
load. Email++, Ticket Server and PGP introduce more traffic in the network 
than other schemes like SPF, Sender ID, and Yahoo Domain Keys, and TEOS. 
• Email++, Yahoo Domain Keys and PGP provide extra features, such as 
validation of the message content. Email++ and sender ID support mail 
relaying. 
     
    
 61 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF EMAIL++ 
5.1 Objectives 
 This chapter describes the performance evaluation of Email++. It describes the 
metrics considered for evaluating the performance and the significance of each metric. It 
also describes the experimental setup, design of each experiment and observations from 
each experiment. It concludes with the summary of the performance evaluation. 
5.2 Performance Measures of Interest 
 This section summarizes the most important criteria for the performance 
evaluation of Email++. 
5.2.1 CPU Demand 
 Email++ implementation in the sender SMTP server requires extra CPU resources 
for MD5 calculations before sending mail and for satisfying out-of-band validation 
requests from mail recipients. This is an important metric, which should be carefully 
evaluated. If Email++ is CPU intensive, the net result may impact the performance of the 
mail server. The extra overload on the server can lead to low throughput of the mail 
server, and unpredictable latency in email delivery.  
5.2.2 Memory Demand 
 The Email++ server at the sender side and the client at the recipient are not very 
memory intensive. Extra disk space is required on the server side for maintaining the 
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MD5 lists of mail for each user. The Email++ server and client modules require some 
disk space.   
5.2.3 Bandwidth Demand 
 
 Email++ adds extra traffic to the existing system by its out-of-band TCP 
connections between client and server for validating the sender. For obtaining the IP 
address of sender’s email server an additional DNS query increases the traffic further.  
However the amount of extra traffic in out of band connections is predictable, as the size 
of the hash value and timestamp are always constant for any size email. At the receiver, 
the DNS query from receiver to its name server adds traffic equal to one normal DNS 
query.  
5.2.4 Increased Email Latency 
  The hashing of email, before delivery at the sender side and the validating of 
email before placing it in the actual inbox of the receiver at the receiver side, adds some 
latency to the actual delivery time. This latency is not exactly predictable, as it depends 
on the server load, distance between the sender and receiver, bandwidth available, and 
network conditions.  
5.2.5 DNS Load  
 
 The Email++ mechanism adds an extra DNS request for each email that is 
received for that domain. This may increase the load on the DNS server.  
5.3 Experimental Setup 
 
 To test the specification of Email++, the Email++ client and Email++ server 
modules were developed in C language. A new mail server called Email++ mail server 
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was setup in the USF Computer Science and Engineering domain (csee domain). The 
server module of Email++ was installed in the Email++ mail server. The Email++ client 
module is installed and executed from the sender user agent, which generated the email 
traffic. The mail server is configured in such a way that if the mail is for the local user of 
the domain, it is kept in the user’s account otherwise it is forwarded to the common 
gateway of the Computer Science and Engineering Domain network.  
 
                Figure 5.1: Experimental Setup 
 
 
5.4 Design of Experiments 
 
 This section describes the design of experiments for evaluating the performance 
of an Email++ client and server. 
 This section describes the experiments conducted to evaluate the performance of 
the sender’s mail server. The performance metrics evaluated are CPU demand, memory 
demand, and network bandwidth demand. 
• CPU utilization experiment:  In this experiment, the sender sends 500 mails of 
450 bytes each to the mail server and monitors the percentage of CPU utilized and 
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the time taken for delivering the mails. The Linux tools SAR, vmstat and top were 
used to get the monitoring information. The percentage of CPU utilized is 
measured with the Linux perfmon tool. This experiment was run for both regular 
SMTP and for Email++ enabled SMTP. The control variable is the number of 
mails and the response variable is the percentage utilization of CPU. 
 
• Memory utilization experiment:  This experiment evaluates the extra memory 
resources required by the Email++, when compared to regular SMTP. In this 
experiment the sender sends 500 mails of 450 bytes each and monitors the 
percentage of main memory utilized by using the Linux monitoring tool top. The 
control variable is the number of mails and the response variable is the percentage 
utilization of main memory. 
 
• Bandwidth utilization experiment:  This experiment measures the percentage of 
extra bandwidth utilization of Email++. The client receives 500 mails of varying 
size 0.5 KB, 1.5 KB, 2.5 KB, 3.5 KB, 4.5 KB, 5.5 KB, 6.5KB to measure how the 
percentage of extra traffic generated by Email++ varies with the size of the mail. 
5.5 Experimental Results 
 This section describes the results from the experiments described in the previous 
section. This section also describes additional experiments conducted to further 
understand or support the results from the defined experiments. 
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  Figure 5.2 shows the result from CPU utilization experiment. The results show 
that Email++ enabled mail server takes more time for 500 mails than the normal SMTP 
server. 
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of CPU Utilization of Regular SMTP and Email++ 
 The percentage of CPU utilized is almost the same for both regular SMTP and 
Email++ enabled   SMTP. The Email++ enabled SMTP server consumes CPU resources 
for longer time than the normal SMTP. The percentage increase in time for 500 mails is 
about 11%. Hence per mail the percentage increase in time is 11 %. Email++ takes more 
time to execute and hence uses CPU resources for longer time.  
 Figure 5.3 shows that the percentage of memory utilized by Email++ enabled mail 
server is slightly larger than that of the regular SMTP. The maximum difference between 
the percentages of memory utilization is nearly 3%. 
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of Memory Utilization of Regular SMTP and Email++ 
 Figure 5.4 shows the percentage of extra traffic generated decreases as the size of 
the mail increases. So as the mail size increases the relative amount of extra traffic 
generated by Email++ decreases. In a worst case when the email size is less than 1KB the 
percentage of extra traffic is about 40%. In an average case when the email size is 3.5KB 
the percentage of extra traffic is around 15%. 
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Figure 5.4: Percentage of Extra Traffic as Mail Size Increases 
 
5.6 Discussion of Results 
  
 The CPU utilization experiment shows that the Email++ enabled mail server takes 
11% more time for sending 500 emails of 450KB each. The extra time incurred was from 
the MD5 calculations and the out of band connections. CPU utilization experiment #1 
and CPU utilization experiment #2 were conducted to evaluate the time taken for MD5 
calculations and out of band connections respectively. 
 
• CPU utilization experiment #1: In this experiment 500 mails of 450 bytes each 
were sent to the mail server and the percent of CPU utilized and the time taken for 
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delivering the mails is monitored by turning off the out-of-band validations. So 
the extra time incurred in this case should be from the MD5 calculations alone. 
 Figure 5.5 shows the results of CPU utilization experiment #1. It suggests that the 
amount of time and CPU utilized by MD5 calculations is negligible. The amount of time 
incurred from MD5 computations for 500 emails of 450 bytes each is less than 1 sec. 
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Figure 5.5: Percentage of CPU Utilization for MD5 Calculations Alone 
CPU utilization experiment #2: This experiment measures the CPU utilization and time 
taken for the out of band connections alone, by turning off MD5 calculations. In this 
experiment 500 mails of 450 bytes each were sent to the mail server and the percent of 
CPU utilized and the time taken for delivering the mails is monitored by turning on the 
out-of-band validations. So the extra time incurred in this case should be from the out-of-
band calculations alone. 
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 Figure 5.6 shows the results of CPU utilization experiment #2. The result suggests 
that major portion of extra time is spent in out of band connections and validations than 
the MD5 calculations. 
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Figure 5.6: Percentage of CPU Utilization for Out-of-band Connections Alone 
CPU utilization experiment #1 shows that the time taken for MD5 calculations of emails 
of 450 bytes is negligible. To check how the time taken for MD5 calculations varies for 
larger emails, the MD5 experiment was conducted. 
 
MD5 experiment: This experiment computes the amount of time taken for 500 MD5 
computations by increasing the email size to 1KB, 2KB, 4KB, 8KB, 16KB, and 32KB 
 Figure 5.7 shows the results of MD5 experiment. It shows that as the size of the 
message increases from 1KB, 2KB, 4KB, 8KB, 16KB, and 32KB the amount of time 
required for MD5 computation is approximately doubled. For 500 mails of 32Kbytes the 
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time taken is nearly 1 second. The amount of time taken for 1 message of 1KB is 0.00006 
seconds (60 microseconds).  
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Figure 5.7: Time Taken for MD5 Calculations as Message Size Increases 
The results from memory utilization experiment shows that the percentage of 
memory utilized by Email++ server is nearly 3% more than the regular SMTP server. 
From this we can conclude that Email++ is not very memory intensive.  The amount of 
disk space required for installing the Email++ server is 35KB. The amount of disk space 
required for storing one MD5 record is 35 bytes. 
 The results from the bandwidth utilization experiment shows that as the size of 
the email increases the percentage of the extra traffic decreases. This behavior is obvious 
as Email++ adds a constant amount of traffic for any mail size. An experiment was 
conducted to check how the throughput of the email server varies with increasing 
message size. 
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Throughput experiment:  This experiment compares the throughput of regular SMTP and 
Email++ enabled SMTP by increasing mail size. This experiment was conducted by 
varying the mail size as 0.5KB, 1.5KB, 2.5KB, 4.5KB, and 6.5KB. The throughput is 
calculated as number of mails per second.  
 Figure 5.8 show that there is a constant decrease in the throughput of regular 
SMTP and Email++ enabled SMTP. The results can be justified as follows. The extra 
overhead to the server comes from MD5 computations and out-of-band validations. As 
the mail size increases the overhead incurred from MD5 validations is negligible as 
shown in MD5 experiment. For out-of-band validations the amount of data sent is same 
for any sized mail hence it takes same amount of time and resources.  As the size of the 
mail increases the percentage decrease in throughput is nearly constant. 
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 Figure 5.8: Comparison of Throughput of Regular SMTP and Email ++  
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No extra load is added on DNS at the sender side. But the number of connections that 
server should hold per email increases from two (one for SMTP and one for DNS) to 
three (an extra connection for out-of-band connection.)  
 The extra CPU is required for calculating the MD5 calculations and the out-of-
band connections. Each recipient should calculate one MD5 hash for each mail. From the 
results of MD5 experiment, we can conclude the amount of time for one MD5 is 
negligible. 
 Extra disk space is required for installing the MD5 client, which takes 92Kbytes 
The Email++ client queries the DNS to get the IP address of the sender’s mail server. 
Extra traffic generated by this query is equal to the traffic of one DNS query. 
 
5.7 Summary of Performance Evaluation 
 
The performance evaluation of Email++ shows that an Email++ mailserver takes 
11% more time than the regular SMTP server to process the same amount of mail. Most 
of the extra time is spent in out-of-band validations and the time incurred from MD5 
calculations is insignificant. The experiment results shows that Email++ is not very 
memory intensive. The maximum memory utilization percentage difference between 
regular SMTP server and Email++ mail server is shown to be approximately 3%. 
Email++ is bandwidth intensive for small mails less than 1KB. It is shown that for 
smaller mails the percentage of extra traffic is above 40%. But as the mail size increases 
in the average case when the mail size is 3.5 KB the percentage of extra traffic is nearly 
15%. The experimental results prove that Email++ adds minimal burden on the existing 
system without degrading the performance of that system. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
6.1 Summary  
 Email has become a vital mode of communication and SMTP is the standard 
protocol for its implementation. SMTP does not perform sender authentication and is thus 
vulnerable to sender identification spoofing. This vulnerability is exploited by spammers.  
In the current SMTP standard the sender is not accountable to the mail he/she sends. 
Hence techniques to make SMTP more secure are required. This thesis describes a new 
authentication mechanism called Email++ for validating the sender of an email.  
The new authentication mechanism detects spoofing of the sender’s address by 
verifying the address using an out-of-band connection to the sender’s mail server. This 
mechanism also ensures that the contents of the mail are not tampered with in transit. The 
authentication mechanism is implemented and validated. The impact of the mechanism 
on the performance of the existing system is evaluated. The results show that the new 
mechanism imposes 11% extra CPU overhead. The Memory demand is negligible. The 
amount of extra traffic imposed is 15%. The extra load on DNS is one extra connection  
per email sent. 
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6.2 Enhancing Email++  
 
 One important issue is the consideration of multiple email servers for a single 
domain. The current design of Email++ considers a single mail server per domain. This 
should be extended to multiple email servers per domain environment. 
A possible enhancement to Email++ would be to implement a sender payment 
scheme over the existing system. The out-of-band communication channel can be used by 
the receiver to issue a puzzle to the sender. The sender can send the results back to the 
receiver using the same connection. The receiver can check the result and if its valid, the 
mail is forwarded from temporary mailbox to the actual mailbox of the receiver. Having 
the out-of-band connection mechanism in place makes it easy to implement the sender 
payment schemes. In addition to that, once the sender gets through the out-of-band 
authentication phase, its proved that both the sender and receiver are real not faked. This 
helps to implement the sender payment scheme more securely. 
 
6.3 Adaptation of Email++ to Other Systems  
The basic idea in Email++ can be adapted to other systems that are susceptible to 
spoofing. Source address spoofing is possible in cases where the sender does not require 
any information back from the receiver. The idea in Email++ is to make a connection 
back to the sender with the address the sender provided to make sure if it is valid. If the 
sender provides a forged address, the forged address will be contacted, and hence the 
source of the forgery can be identified. 
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The DNS system is also susceptible to spoofing. DNS servers constantly update 
their database with the latest information sent from other DNS servers. Some DNS 
servers accept a response from any server and update its cache with the relevant 
information. It does not really authenticate whether the response came from the true 
domain. This also results in cache poisoning. The idea of an out-of-band connection can 
be applied in this context where after the update is received by the DNS server, it 
contacts the source to make sure that the data was in fact sent from the domain. 
SMS messages can be classified as cell phone originated SMS, that is sending 
SMS from cell phone to other cell phone, or web based SMS, sending SMS through web 
interface to a cell phone. Both cell phone originated SMS and web based SMS are 
susceptible to spoofing, but web based spoofing is easy to do. But web based SMS are 
more susceptible to spoofing. The idea of an out-of-band connection for sender 
authentication can be used to avoid SMS web based spoofing, where the web site domain 
maintains a validation service, and the receiver makes an out-of-band connection to the 
sender domain to make sure the message was in fact sent from the valid user of the 
domain. 
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